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The Eastern Enlargements of the EU:  
Why and How Far?
φ 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
On 1 May 2004 the European Union (EU) became a Union of 25 Member States (EU-25). 
Eight Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) as well as Cyprus and Malta joined 
the EU in its largest enlargement ever. Before this could happen both sides, the 10 
newcomers and the EU itself had to go through various reforms in the hope that the new 
much larger Union will be able to function in a satisfactory way in the future. In this paper 
we shall outline these gradual processes of preparation for the May 2004 enlargement and 
discuss the current situation where Bulgaria and Romania expect to join in 2007 and other 
states hope to join as soon as possible. Why does the EU keep enlarging and what are the 
implications for the future of European integration?  
  
  In connection with EU enlargements in the past we have often seen a debate on 
“Deepening versus Widening” (Wallace, 1989; De la Serre, 1991; Wessels, 1996). 
Widening, or enlargement, was linked with deepening by many political actors. The first 
enlargement agreed at the summit in The Hague in 1969 was for instance linked with the 
creation of European Political Cooperation (EPC), the foreign policy cooperation among the 
member states, which started in 1970. So EPC was in place when the UK, Ireland and 
Denmark joined the then existing European Communities (EC) in 1973. Greek membership 
followed in 1981 without similar EC reforms, but Spanish and Portuguese membership in 
1986 came in parallel with the Single European Act (SEA), which was the first major 
reform of the EC. In order to complete the internal market qualified majority voting (QMV) 
was made the normal decision rule for adopting internal market legislation. The SEA 
thereby contributed to giving the process of European integration a new momentum in the 
mid-1980s. The enlargement which brought Austria, Finland and Sweden into the EU on 1 
January 1995 was made on the basis of the Maastricht Treaty, which had created the EU in 
1993. It deepened integration in various ways, inter alia by outlining the phases towards 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), by giving the European Parliament a right of co-
decision in a number of policy areas, by adding several new policy chapters, even including 
education and culture, and by upgrading EPC to become Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP), which for the first time also included defence policy (Laursen and 
Vanhoonacker, 1992). Further, Maastricht started a more formalised Justice and Home 
Affairs (JHA) cooperation. 
  
  The Maastricht Treaty foresaw an intergovernmental conference (IGC) to review the 
treaty in 1996. This conference, which produced the Amsterdam Treaty, was seen as the 
conference which would make the next enlargement(s) possible, including the accession of 
                                                           
φ Part of this paper is a revised and up-dated version of a paper prepared for the 10th ASEF 
University, “Enlarging European Union and Asia” at Keio University, Tokyo, 22 May – 5 June 2004. 
Sections of the paper rely on earlier writings by the author, esp. Laursen, 2001. 
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the CEECs that had now applied for membership (Ludlow et al., 1995). In the end 
Amsterdam failed to solve the institutional issues. This explains that there was yet another 
treaty reform in 2000, the Treaty of Nice, which officially made enlargement possible. But 
still, the Fifteen had doubts, so a further reform followed, producing a so-called 
Constitutional Treaty in 2004. This latest treaty is now going through the ratification process 
in the 25 member states. 
  
  Cyprus and Malta applied for membership in 1990. Ten CEECs applied during the 
mid 1990s in the following order: Hungary, 31 March 1994; Poland, 5 April 1994; 
Romania, 22 June 1995; Slovakia, 27 June 1995; Latvia, 13 October 1995; Estonia, 24 
November 1995; Lithuania, 8 December 1995; Bulgaria, 14 December 1995; the Czech 
Republic, 17 January 1996 and Slovenia, 10 June 1996 (European Commission, 1996). 
  
  All these applications came after the EU decided at its summit in Copenhagen in 
December 1993 that the CEECs would be able to join in the future once certain conditions 
were fulfilled. 
 
  To the applications mentioned we should add an application from Turkey from 
1987. However, the Commission had concluded in its opinion in 1989 that Turkey, although 
in principle eligible, was not ready for membership (European Commission, 1989).  But in 
1999 Turkey was officially recognized as a candidate. 
 
Why Enlargement? 
 
The 5
th enlargement of the EU has been a gradual and rather long process. It took time partly 
because it was a group of countries that needed to go through economic and political 
transitions from Communist rule and central economic planning to democracy and market 
economy. But at the same time it is fair to say that a number of Member States of EU-15 
were not enthusiastic about the Eastern enlargement. Any change of this ampleur affects 
vested interests. If we use rational models to explain enlargement we will face a puzzle 
(Sedelmeier, 2000; Schimmelfennig 2001 and 2003). Countries depending on the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) had no interests in getting in the competitors from the East. This 
includes France. Countries receiving a lot of money from the Structural Funds had no 
interests in getting in the competitors from the East either. Even if it can be argued that all 
EU-15 had an interest in stability in Europe, the EU could try to contribute to stability in 
other ways such as the financial aid that was given to the CEECs from early on after the end 
of the Cold War through the PHARE and other programs. 
 
  For some of the EU-15 Member States there was a rational argument in favour, 
namely a larger market. Freer trade and investment flows would contribute to economic 
growth, but again these effects could be realized short of membership, through free trade 
agreements such as the Europe Agreements concluded with the CEECs in the first part of 
the 1990s. 
 
  In the end enlargement was a political choice taken by EU-15, much aided by the 
European Commission, which played the role of a supranational leader or policy   3
entrepreneur. We will notice in the following that the decisive decisions taken along the way 
by the European Council from the Copenhagen meeting in June 1993, when the CEECs 
were promised membership, to the Copenhagen meeting in December 2002, when eight 
CEECs as well as Cyprus and Malta concluded accession negotiations, were largely based 
on recommendations from the Commission. But some Presidencies, including the Danish 
Presidency during the second part of 2002 also played important roles (Ludlow, 2004). 
 
  The many statements in favour of assisting the CEECs after the end of the Cold War 
– indeed, during the Cold War, too - gradually added up to a discourse that implied a moral 
commitment to accept these states as members. Schimmelfennig has used ther term 
‘rhetorical entrapment’ (Schimmelfennig, 2003, p.5 and p. 222). Much of this discourse was 
based on a certain idea of a collective European identity. It focused upon democracy and 
human rights. These aspects dealing with democracy and individual rights were reinforced 
within the EU by the treaty reforms through the 1990s, from the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 
to the Nice Treaty in 2001. And the Constitutional Treaty incorporated the Charter of 
Individual Rights adopted in Nice in 2000 as a political document, making it legally binding. 
 
  Seen from the perspective of the applicant countries the EU has been a success story. 
It started with six countries in the early 1950s. At that time the UK and the Scandinavian 
countries did not join. But the counter-organisation, the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA), which they created in 1960, turned out to be insufficient. Eventually most EFTA 
countries concluded that the costs of exclusion were too great (Mattli, 1999). They joined a 
club whose rules some of them did not fully support. This included the UK and Denmark, 
which joined in the first enlargement in 1973, and which have been foot-dragging members 
since. The last EFTA countries to join in 1995, Austria, Sweden and Finland, were those 
which had concluded for geopolitical reasons that they could not join during the Cold War. 
Similarly the CEECs could only contemplate joining after the end of the Cold War. In 
between, Greece, Spain and Portugal could only join after they had shed authoritarian 
regimes. 
 
  So the EC/EU has been an expanding club of democratic European states. In parallel 
with this geographical expansion the process has also gradually expanded the functional 
scope of integration, from limited sector integration in the 1950s to become a fully-fledged 
internal market and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
  This process has contributed to creating a ‘security community’ in Europe. This 
community is now gradually being expanded to include the whole of Europe.  
 
The Development of EC/EU Enlargement Policy 
 
From the start of the European integration process, from the Schuman Plan in 1950 and the 
creation of the first European Community, the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) in 1952, the idea was that other European states that so wished could join, and after 
the creation of the two other Communities, the European Economic Community (EEC) and 
the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) in 1958, the European 
Communities (EC) went through three enlargements before the Maastricht Treaty created   4
the European Union (EU), in 1993. The enlargement in 2004 was the fifth, and certainly not 
the last. 
 
 The  Maastricht  Treaty  in article O stipulated: 
 
   “Any European State may apply to become a Member of the Union. It shall 
address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after 
consulting the Commission and after receiving the assent of the European 
Parliament, which shall act by an absolute majority of its component 
members. 
 
    The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on 
which the Union is founded which such admission entails shall be the subject 
of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant State. This 
agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in 
accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.” 
 
  Article O was procedure oriented. The basic procedure has not changed. The 
European Parliament (EP) must give its assent, which is a power it has had since the SEA in 
1987. It means that the EP has a veto on enlargement.  Given the fact that unanimity is 
required in the Council each Member State also has a veto. A Member State must be 
European. Morocco, which applied in 1987, was told that it cannot join because it is not 
European. Although the Commission opinion on Turkish membership in 1989 was negative, 
the question of eligibility was answered in the affirmative.  
 
  The European Council meeting in Maastricht in December 1991 also issued a short 
statement on enlargement, saying "that any European State whose system of Government is 
founded on the principle of democracy may apply to become a member of the Union." In 
reality democracy has been an implied principle from the beginning. This condition was 
confirmed by the Amsterdam Treaty, which added a reference to a new article 6 which 
states: ‘The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law’ (Art. 6). 
 
  In December 1991 the European Council had invited the Commission to prepare a 
report on enlargement for the Lisbon summit in June 1992 (Agence Europe, 12 December 
1991). The Commission presented this report on "Europe and the challenge of enlargement" 
to the meeting of the European Council in Lisbon in June 1992. It referred to a new context, 
partly because of the completion of the internal market and the signing of the Maastricht 
Treaty, partly because of the end of the Cold War. The integration of the CEECs was now 
seen as "a historic opportunity". It could contribute to the "unification of the whole of 
Europe" (European Commission, 1992). 
 
   The Lisbon Report suggested the following conditions of membership: 
 
  1. Democracy and the respect of fundamental human rights; 
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  2. Acceptance of the Community system and capacity to implement it, including a 
  functioning and competitive market economy, and an adequate legal and 
administrative framework;   
 
 3.  Acceptance  and  capacity to implement the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
"as   it evolves over the coming years.” 
 
  The concern at this time was still mainly with the applicants that joined in 1995. 
That Austria, Sweden and Finland had been non-aligned during the Cold War explains the 
explicit reference to CFSP. At the time of the Lisbon summit none of the CEECs had 
applied for membership, but it was known that they wanted to join. Association agreements, 
called Europe Agreements, had been negotiated with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, 
and negotiations on similar agreements were taking place with Bulgaria and Romania. Trade 
and Cooperation Agreements had been signed with the three Baltic States and Albania. 
 
  The Europe Agreements acknowledged that membership was the goal of the 
CEECs, but the EC side did not offer such membership at the time. The subtle language 
used, for instance, in the Hungarian agreement, was that "the final objective of Hungary is to 
become a member of the Community and that this association, in the view of the Parties, 
will help to achieve this objective..." (OJ L 347, 31 December 1993). 
 
  Concerning membership for the CEECs a break-through came at the Copenhagen 
meeting of the European Council, 21-22 June 1993, where the Heads of State or 
Government agreed, that "the associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so 
desire shall become members of the European Union." The economic and political 
conditions were listed in the following way: 
 
  “Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning 
market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure 
and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the 
candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including 
adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union” (quoted 
from Laursen and Vanhoonacker, 1994: 458). 
 
The Presidency conclusions then went on: 
 
  “The Union's capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the 
momentum of European integration, is also an important consideration in the 
general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries.” 
 
  Put differently, both the EU and the candidate countries had to be ready. Widening 
was linked with the EU’s capacity to continue the process of integration, although different 
Member States had different ideas of what that meant. 
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Profile of the Acceding and Candidate Countries 
 
One of the reasons why the EU was slow in promising membership to the CEECs was that 
these countries were relatively poor, and they had to go through political and economic 
transitions to be able to function inside the EU. They needed to go through a transition 
process from Communist political regimes to pluralist democracies and from centrally 
planned economies to market economies. The economic profiles of the CEECs also meant 
that it would have some costs in budgetary terms to admit them. Further, the group of 
applicants was much bigger than earlier groups of applicants. The EU had as a maximum 
admitted three new member states at a time in the past. At the same time some EU Member 
States were preoccupied with meeting the conditions of participation in the single currency, 
the euro. 
 
  Table 1 gives figures from 2002 for population, gross domestic product (GDP) in 
purchasing power standards (PPS) as well as the share of agriculture and employment. If we 
look at the population figures we notice that most of the acceding countries are relatively 
small, with Poland being the main exception. The 10 countries that have acceded on 1 May 
2004 have added 74.3 million inhabitants to the EU, taking the total EU population to 452.7 
million. Turkey is by far the biggest applicant country. When Turkey joins it will be number 
two in terms of population after Germany. 
 
  If we look at GDP figures we notice rather great variation between the 10 countries 
that have now acceded, varying from Slovenia’s €17,700 per capita down to Latvia’s 
€8,500. The average among the acceding 10 countries is €11,150 compared with more than 
the double average in the old EU-15 of €24,010. Turkey is the poorest among the candidates 
with a GDP per capita of €5,500. 
 
  Next we have included figures for agriculture because the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) is the most expensive of the existing common policies in the EU. The share of 
agriculture varies in the acceding 10 countries between 2.3% in Malta to 19.6 % in Poland. 
The share is also relatively high in Lithuania, with 18.6% and Latvia with 15.3%. But it is as 
high as 33.2% in Turkey and 37.7% in Romania. 
 
Table 2 gives some macro-economic figures for the CEECs. At the end of the 
Cold War, when the CEECs started the transition process, many of them experienced a 
fall in growth, high unemployment and high inflation. But by 2002 the leading candidates 
had reached reasonable growth figures, with the three Baltic States in front with figures 
of 6% growth or above. Unemployment remained relatively high in Poland with 19.9% 
and Slovakia with 18.6%. Unemployment was also relatively high in Latvia and 
Lithuania. Inflation rates had come down to reasonable levels in the leading candidate 
states, but remained high in Romania with 22.5% and Turkey with 45%. 
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Table 1: Population, Income and Agricultural Shares in Acceding and Candidate 
Countries, 2002 
  Population 
(millions) 
GDP per capita in 
purchasing power 
standards (PPS) in 
€ 
Share of agriculture 
as % of 
employment 
Bulgaria  7.9 5  900  10.7 
Cyprus  0.8 17  400  5.3 
Czech Rep.  10.2 14  400  4.9 
Estonia  1.4 10  000  6.5 
Hungary  10.2 13  600  6.0 
Latvia  2.4 8  500  15.3 
Lithuania  3.5 9  400  18.6 
Malta  0.4  11 700(2) 2.3(1) 
Poland  38.2 9  500  19.6 
Romania  21.8 5  900  37.7 
Slovakia  5.4 11  400  6.6 
Slovenia  2.0 17  700  9.7 
Turkey  69.6 5  500  33.2 
 
EU-15  378.4 24  010 
Acceding 10  74.3  11 150(3) 
EU-25  452.7  21 910(3) 
Source: European Commission 2003a. 
(1)  2001 
(2)  1999 
(3)  This figure is an approximation based on PPS calculated for the EU-15; PPS is at this state 
not yet available on the basis of EU-25. 
 
Table 2:  Growth, Unemployment and Inflation, 2002 
  GDP Growth 
(% change) 
Unemployment rate 
(% of labor force) 
Inflation rate 
(year-on-year in 
%) 
Bulgaria  4.8 18.1 5.8 
Cyprus  2.2 3.8  2.8 
Czech Republic  2.0 7.3  1.4 
Estonia  6.0 9.1  3.6 
Hungary  3.3 5.6  5.2 
Latvia  6.1 12.8 2.0 
Lithuania  6.7 13.1 0.4 
Malta  1.2 7.4  2.2 
Poland  1.6 19.9 1.9 
Romania  4.9 7.0  22.5 
Slovakia  4.4 18.6 3.3 
Slovenia  3.2 6.0  7.5 
Turkey  7.8 10.4  45 
 
Source: European Commission, 2003a. 
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  If we look at the political side of the profile of the new members and applicants the 
CEECs have had to go through a political transition process from Communist one-party rule 
before 1989 to pluralistic multi-party political systems today. Democracy is not easy to 
establish from one day to the next. It depends on a certain political culture that takes time to 
develop. In a 1991 report the Commission officials suggested that the democratic tradition 
was weak in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary and practically “none” in Romania and 
Bulgaria (European Commission 1991). How quickly could one then expect democracy, 
including the rule of law and respect of human rights and ethnic minorities to take roots in 
these countries? 
 
  In principle the new Member States should by today have established democratic 
regimes. But we do see rather volatile politics in some of them and one can fear that 
populist parties may come to power. There are also still concerns about the treatment of 
ethnic minorities in some of the CEECs. But the Amsterdam Treaty introduced a 
democracy surveillance mechanism that was further strengthened by the Treaty of Nice in 
2000. This procedure will allow the suspension of certain rights including voting rights in 
case democratic rules and human rights are not respected (Article 7 TEU). 
 
 
Agenda 2000 
 
Agenda 2000 was the name given to the opinions and composite documents on enlargement 
published as a series of communications from the Commission on 15 July 1997. Volume I, 
entitled "For a Stronger and Wider Union" gave an overview. The Commission made a 
proposal for the new financial framework for 2000-2006 and recognized the need for 
reforms of the EU's Common Agricultural Policy and structural policies. Volume II was 
entitled "Reinforcing the Pre-accession Strategy".  Also included in Agenda 2000 were the 
individual Commission opinions on the 10 CEEC applicants (European Commission, 1997).  
 
 Concerning  the  applicants the Commission concluded that Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Estonia and Slovenia were closest to meeting the membership criteria 
set up at the European Council meeting in Copenhagen in June 1993. It was therefore 
recommended to start accession negotiations with these five CEECs. The remaining five 
should receive further assistance through a reinforced pre-accession strategy. 
 
  The proposed financial framework was based on the assumption that the first 
Eastern enlargement with five CEECs would take place in 2002. This meant that the 
budgetary costs of the CAP and structural policies would only partly be felt during the seven 
years of the 2000-2006 framework. On the further assumptions of average annual economic 
growth of 2.5% among the current member states and 4% among the applicants the 
Commission concluded that the financial framework for 2000-2006 could be kept under the 
current ceiling of 1.27% of the GDP of the member states (ibid., p. 51). 
 
  The differentiation proposed by the Commission between the five front runners 
plus Cyprus (5 + 1) and the remaining five in a second group led to a fair amount of 
discussion during the second part of 1997. (At this point in time Malta had withdrawn its   9
application). The European Council decided in Luxembourg in December 1997 ‘to launch 
an accession process comprising the ten Central and East European applicant States and 
Cyprus.’ The accession process would be launched on 30 March 1998 by a meeting of the 
foreign ministers of the Fifteen Member States and Eleven applicant countries. There would 
be an enhanced pre-accession strategy including accession partnerships and increased pre-
accession aid. Bilateral intergovernmental conferences would be convened in the spring of 
1998 to begin negotiations with Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic and 
Slovenia. At the same time ‘the preparation of negotiations with Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Bulgaria will be speeded up in particular through an analytical examination of 
the Union acquis.’ There would be a review procedure. ‘From the end of 1998, the 
Commission will make regular reports to the Council, together with any necessary 
recommendations for opening bilateral intergovernmental conferences, reviewing the 
progress of each Central and East European applicant State towards accession in the light of 
the Copenhagen criteria, in particular the rate at which it is adopting the Union acquis’ 
(Agence Europe, 15 December 1997). 
 
1999 was the year when the EU finally agreed on some reforms of the CAP as 
well as the new financial framework for 2000-2006. This happened during the German 
Presidency in the first part of the year. Towards the end of that year, during the Finnish 
Presidency, it was decided to start accession negotiations with the remaining CEEC 
applicants plus Malta, which had reintroduced its application for membership in 1998. 
 
  The CAP reform included reduction in base price for beef meat (20 percent in 
three stages), price cuts for milk combined with specific quota increases and lower 
intervention prices for grains (20 percent in two stages) (Agence Europe, 12 March 1999 
and 18 March 1999). The reform continued the reform of 1992, which had been made 
necessary by the GATT Uruguay Round. The EU was gradually moving away from 
guaranteed high prices to income support for the farmers. 
 
  Final agreement on all the chapters of Agenda 2000 was reached at the Berlin 
summit in March 1999. The CAP reform was slightly diluted by a postponement of the 
reform of the milk sector and a change in the reduction of the intervention price for 
cereals to 15 per cent. Structural policy was also an issue at the Berlin meeting. In the end 
the Cohesion Fund appropriation was increased from 15 to 18 billion Euro over the 2000-
2006 budget framework period (Agence Europe, 27 March 1999). 
 
  It took 20 hours of difficult and sometimes acrimonious negotiations in Berlin to 
reach the agreement. The total expenditure for agriculture would actually increase. 
Money for structural policies would be slightly reduced (Financial Times, March 27/28, 
1999). The agreement was welcomed as paving the way for enlargement. 
 
Accession Negotiations 
 
The accession process formally started on 30 March 1998 with a meeting between the EU 
and the 11 applicants. Council President Robin Cook reminded the applicants that 
membership implied the full acceptance of the acquis communautaire as well as its effective  10
application. It also implied the full acceptance of the common positions, common actions 
and other acts in the context of CFSP as well as common actions, common positions, 
conventions and other acts agreed within the framework of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 
cooperation (Agence Europe, 30 March 1999). 
 
  After the formal opening of the accession process membership negotiations 
officially started with the 5+1 within the framework of six separate IGCs on 31 March  
(Agence Europe, 1 April, 1999). But during the first months of the process all 11 candidates 
went through a ‘screening process’ which started on 3 April (Agence Europe, 8 April 1999). 
On 10 November 1999 real negotiations started with the members of the first group on the 
first seven chapters that had been covered during the screening process.  
 
  On 4 November 1998 the Commission adopted progress reports on the applicants. 
Although the Commission did not recommend starting negotiations with any of the Five in 
the second group the progress in Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia was especially noted.  
 
  In the autumn of 1999 the Commission again published reports on the applicants. 
This time the Commission recommended that “negotiations should be opened in 2000 with 
all candidate countries which meet the political criteria for membership and have proved to 
be ready to take the necessary measures to comply with the economic criteria, i.e. Bulgaria, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovakia” (European Commission, 1999, p. 31). On 
Turkey the Commission remarked: “Turkey has expressed the wish to be a candidate 
country and should be considered as such” (ibid., p. 11.) 
 
  The meeting of the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999 followed the 
recommendation from the Commission: “Determined to lend a positive contribution to 
security and stability on the European continent and in the light of recent developments as 
well as the Commission’s reports, the European Council has decided to convene bilateral 
intergovernmental conferences in February 2000 to begin negotiations with Romania, 
Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Malta on the conditions for their entry into the 
Union and the ensuing Treaty adjustments” (European Council, 1999c). 
 
 The  Helsinki  summit  also welcomed the launch of talks aiming at a comprehensive 
settlement of the Cyprus problem. A political settlement would facilitate the accession of 
Cyprus to the EU.  But, the European Council said, “If no settlement has been reached by 
the completion of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be made 
without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant 
factors.”
1 
 
  Helsinki further decided to make Turkey a formal candidate. The European Council 
welcomed “recent positive developments” in Turkey,” and went on to say: “Turkey is a 
candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the 
                                                           
1 Seen in retrospect it could be argued that this decision was a mistake. The EU lost bargaining 
power with the Greek Cypriots that eventually turned down a reunification plan that was accepted by the 
Turkish Cypriots in April 2004.   11
other candidate States.” Turkey would from now on “benefit from a pre-accession strategy 
to stimulate and support its reforms.”    
 
  During the years 2000 and 2001 negotiations then took place with 12 applicant 
countries. Each autumn the Commission issued its ‘report cards’ on progress on the 31 
chapters that were covered in the negotiations.  These 31 chapters are listed in table 3.  
 
Table 3: The 31 Chapters of the Accession Negotiations 
1. Free movement of 
goods 
12. Statistics  23. Consumers and health 
protection 
2. Free movement of 
persons 
13. Social policy  24. Justice and home affairs 
3. Free movement of 
services 
14. Energy  25. Customs union 
4. Free movement of 
capital 
15. Industry  26. External Relations 
5. Company law  16. SMEs  27. CFSP 
6. Competition  17. Science and 
research 
28. Financial control 
7. Agriculture  18. Education and 
training 
29. Financial and budgetary 
provisions 
8. Fisheries  19. 
Telecommunication 
30. Institutions 
9. Transport          20. Culture and 
audiovisual 
31. Other 
10. Taxation  21. Regional policy   
11. EMU  22. Environment   
Source: Commission reports 
 
 
  The list of chapters starts with the four freedoms of the internal market. Then follow 
the various common policies. And it finishes with financial and institutional issues. Some 
estimates say that the EU’s acquis communautaire runs into about 80,000 pages. The EU is 
a case of deep integration, not shallow integration like the kind of integration found in 
various free trade areas (FTAs) in different parts of the world (Laursen, 2003a). This is why 
joining the EU requires a huge effort on the part of the candidates. 
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Table 4: Progress in negotiations 
 Chapters 
Closed  by 
October 2001 
Chapters 
Closed  by 
October 2002 
Chapters 
Closed  by 
October 2003 
Chapters 
Closed by  
September 
2004 
Cyprus  23 28  31  
Czech 
Republic 
21 25  31  
Estonia  19 28  31  
Hungary  22 26  31  
Poland  18 27  31  
Slovenia  21 28  31  
Bulgaria  12 22  26  31 
Latvia  18 27  31  
Lithuania  18 28  31  
Malta  18 25  31  
Romania  8 13  20  26 
Slovakia  20 27  31  
Sources: Commission 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004 
 
 
  Table 4 shows the number of chapters closed through the last couple of the years of 
the negotiations. By December 2002 the 10 applicants that joined in May 2004 had closed 
all the 31 chapters. Least progress had been made by Bulgaria and Romania. The chapters 
causing the biggest problems, agriculture as well as financial and budgetary provisions, were 
the last to be opened and closed. 
 
The Copenhagen Summit 2002: the End Game of the Negotiations
2 
 
In its Strategy Paper put out on 9 October 2002 the Commission concluded that Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia fulfilled 
the political criteria for membership. Further, “Bearing in mind the progress achieved by 
these countries, the track record in implementing their commitments, and taking into 
account their preparatory work in progress, the Commission considers that these countries 
will have fulfilled the economic and acquis criteria and will be ready for membership from 
the beginning of 2004” (European Commission, 2002). 
 
In order to prepare the final EU offer on enlargement and decide about interim 
institutional arrangements after enlargement an extraordinary European Council meeting 
took place in Brussels 24-25 October 2002. 
 
Just prior to the summit the French President Jacques Chirac and German 
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder held a bilateral meeting, where they reached an agreement 
to maintain the financial framework of the CAP until 2006 at the level decided in Berlin 
in 1999 and to start implementing an upper limit on agricultural spending from 2007 to 
                                                           
2 This section partly relies on Finn Laursen and Berenice Lara Laursen, 2003.  13
2013, taking account of inflation. The two leaders managed to reach an agreement on the 
phasing-in of direct aid for farmers in future member states for the 2004-2006 period 
(Agence Europe, 25/10/2002).  
 
The meeting of the European Council in Brussels endorsed the recommendation 
from the Commission that the 10 candidate countries already singled out for membership 
fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria and would be able to “assume the obligations of 
membership from the beginning of 2004.” The Union further reiterated “its preference 
for a reunited Cyprus to join the European Union on the basis of a comprehensive 
settlement” and urged “the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot 
communities to seize the opportunity and reach an agreement before the end of the 
accession negotiations.” Concerning Bulgaria and Romania the European Council 
expressed its support for the two countries’ “efforts to achieve the objective of 
membership in 2007.” And concerning Turkey the Union welcomed “the important steps 
taken by Turkey towards meeting the Copenhagen political criteria” which had “brought 
forward the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey” (European Council, 2002a). 
 
At the meeting several decisions were made relating to the costs of enlargement. 
The ceiling for budgetary expenses agreed by the European Council in Berlin in 1999 for 
2004-2006 had to be respected.  
 
First, there was an agreement on the amount of funds that the candidate countries 
were to receive from the EU structural funds, namely 23 billion euros.  
 
Second, a decision was reached on the phasing in of EU farm subsidies that the 
candidate countries will get as direct payments to the individual farmers. Expressed as a 
percentage of the level of such payments in the Union the schedule would be: 2004: 
25%, 2005: 30%, 2006:35% and 2007: 40%. Afterwards there would be “10% 
increments so as to ensure that the new Member States reach in 2013 the support level 
then applicable in the current European Union.”  
 
Third, it was decided that the rules about own resources would apply to the new 
Member States. But this would make many of the new member states net contributors to 
the EU budget. So, “If the forecast cash flow balance with the Community’s budget 
compared to the year 2003 is negative for individual candidate States in the years 2004-
2006, temporary budgetary compensation will be offered” (European Council, 2002a). 
Or, as the Danish Presidency explained it, “no candidate country is to be in a poorer 
position after accession in relation to the EU budget that before, when they received 
support from the EU for their accession preparations”(Denmark, 2002b, 8). 
 
After the Brussels meeting of the European Council intense individual 
negotiations with the 10 candidate countries took place up to the meeting of the European 
Council in Copenhagen in December, where the final agreement was reached about 
enlargement.  
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The Danish Presidency worked out its “final packages” during November. The 
Presidency’s proposals were criticized by both the current members and the future 
members. The Presidency admitted, “It was a rough reception on both sides, Member 
States and candidates. Reactions were more negative than expected.” Since the net cost of 
enlargement for the period 2004-2006, according to the Danish compromise proposal, 
would be 1.3 billion euro higher than calculated on the basis of the financial package 
agreed in Brussels the main ‘net contributors’ (Germany, United Kingdom, Sweden, 
Netherlands and France) found the Presidency’s offer too generous, while most 
candidates considered it largely inadequate (Agence Europe, 28/11/2002). 
 
At the summit intense negotiations took place especially with Poland about 
money and Turkey about a date for the start of negotiations about membership. It was 
agreed that Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia would be able to join from 1 May 2004. For Bulgaria and 
Romania the EU set 2007 as the target date for accession (Denmark 2002b, 9).  
 
Concerning Turkey the Commission had concluded in its annual report in October 
2002 that progress was being made towards fulfilling the political Copenhagen criteria – 
requirements for democracy, protection of minorities and the rule of law – but that the 
country did not fully meet these criteria. 
 
Turkey was pressing for a date. In the end, Copenhagen at least offered a date for 
a decision about a date. The Commission would present a report to the European Council 
in the autumn of 2004 and make a recommendation concerning Turkey’s fulfilment of the 
political Copenhagen criteria. If the European Council decides then, on the basis of the 
Commission report, that Turkey fulfils the criteria the EU will initiate accession 
negotiation with Turkey ‘without delay.’ It was also decided to increase pre-accession 
financial assistance to Turkey (Denmark 2002b, 10). 
 
The Turkish leaders present in Copenhagen were not satisfied. Their US ally had 
also put pressure on the EU leaders, with President Bush personally calling some of them, 
including the Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen.  
 
At the start of the summit the Presidency tried to get a final agreement with the 
other Member States about the final financial offers to the candidates. The Fifteen 
approved various “packages” proposed by the Presidency while insisting that the 
financial offer was “at the limit of budgetary resources”, as Anders Fogh Rasmussen 
expressed it in a press briefing. According to the compromise formula Poland would 
benefit in 2005 and 2006 of a new additional budget facility (cash-flow facility) of 1 
billion euro (550 million in 2005 and 450 million in 2006) to allow the Polish authorities 
better to manage their budgetary difficulties during the first three years of membership. 
At the same time Poland would lose 1 billion euro in revenue in the long term under the 
Structural Funds. In reality therefore this was a money transfer within the budget, which 
would not increase the total costs to the EU budget (Agence Europe, 14/12/2002).  15
A number of other issues were dealt with during the end-game, including Polish 
milk quotas, zero level VAT on medicines and foodstuffs for Malta until 2010, 5-year 
restriction on Czech heavy-goods vehicles in the EU and nuclear safety. 
 
 
The EU’s Institutional Issues 
 
A central aspect of the EU’s capacity to absorb the applicant countries is institutional. We 
have now moved from a Union with 15 to a Union of 25 Member States, and more 
candidates are waiting to join. Could such a Union function on the basis of the original 
institutions designed for a Community of Six? Collective action considerations suggest that 
decision-making becomes more difficult as the number of members increases if decision-
making procedures are not improved in parallel (Laursen, 1994). 
 
  If the voting weights in the Council used in EU-15 were to be extrapolated to the 
CEECs and other candidates the results would be as shown in table 5. The bigger member 
states did not find such an extrapolation acceptable. They called for changes in the 
weights. The problem they saw was that most of the new member states were relatively 
small. The big members did not want a situation where the small members can dominate. 
So they wanted a re-weighting of votes in their favor. 
 
  The question of voting in the Council had been on the agenda of the 1996-97 IGC. 
Some of the larger countries tried to get their number of votes increased relative to the 
smaller countries. There were also suggestions for a double majority, where a majority of 
votes would also require a majority of the EU’s population for a measure to be adopted. 
 
  The composition of the Commission was also discussed during the Amsterdam 
negotiations. In EU-15 the Commission had 20 members, two from Germany, France, 
Spain, Italy and the UK, and one from the remaining 10 members. Many reform proposals 
have suggested that the Commission is getting too big, and that a possible solution would be 
just one member per country. But most large member states now called for a smaller 
Commission. 
 
  In the end the Amsterdam negotiations did not solve these issues (Laursen, 2002, 
2005). The Dutch presidency suggested a re-weighting of the votes in the Council, but no 
agreement could be reached. The Cologne meeting of the European Council in June 1999 
therefore decided: “In order to ensure that the European Union’s institutions can continue to 
work efficiently after enlargement, the European Council confirms its intention of 
convening [an IGC] early in 2000 to resolve the institutional issues left open in Amsterdam 
that need to be settled before enlargement.”  Three topics were singled out: 
 
-  size and composition of the Commission; 
-  weighting of votes in the Council (re-weighting, introduction of dual majority and 
threshold for qualified-majority decision-making); 
-  possible extension of qualified-majority voting in the Council (European Council, 
1999, b).  16
The Helsinki summit in December 1999 confirmed this agenda, leaving open the 
possibility of adding other matters during the IGC, which started in February 2000 and 
which was concluded in Nice in December 2000. The Treaty of Nice introduced new 
weights of votes in the Council (see table 6). Further, a certain number of policy issues 
were moved from unanimity to qualified majority voting (QMV). Concerning the 
Commission the decision was that from enlargement each member state would nominate 
one Commissioner, but once Member State number 27 joins there must be a reduction in 
size and some system of rotation must be introduced. 
 
Table 5: Extrapolation of pre-Nice votes to EU-28 (1999 Eurostat population data) 
Member States  Votes  Population (thousands) 
Germany 10  82  038 
Turkey 10  63  400 
United Kingdom  10  59 247 
France 10  58  966 
Italy 10  57  612 
Spain 8  39  349 
Poland 8  38  667 
Romania 6  22  489 
Netherlands 5  15  760 
Greece 5  10  533 
Czech Republic  5  10 290 
Belgium 5  10  213 
Hungary 5  10  092 
Portugal 5  9  980 
Sweden 4  8  854 
Bulgaria 4  8  230 
Austria 4  8  082 
Slovakia 3  5  393 
Denmark 3  5  313 
Finland 3  5  160 
Ireland 3  3  701 
Lithuania 3  3  744 
Latvia 3  2  439 
Slovenia 3  1  978 
Estonia 3  1  446 
Cyprus 2  752 
Luxembourg 2  429 
Malta 2  377 
TOTAL EU 28  144  544 579 
Determining a qualified majority 
Total votes = 144  Votes  % Votes  Min. % Population 
Qualified Majority  102  70,83%  51,45% 
Blocking Minority  43  29,86%  11,88% 
Source: CONFER 4728/00, 24 March 2000. 1998 data for Malta. Estimated figures for 
Turkey.  17
Table 6: Council Votes in EU-27 (as of 1 January 2005 and thereafter) according to the 
Treaty of Nice 
 Present   
votes 
Future Votes  Population  
(mio.) 
% of Union  
population 
Germany 10  29  82,03  17,05 
United Kingdom  10  29  59,25  12,31 
France 10  29  58,97  12,25 
Italy 10  29  57,61  11,97 
Spain 8  27  39,39  8,19 
Poland   27  38,67  8,04 
Romania   14  22,49  4,67 
Netherlands 5  13  15,76  3,28 
Greece 5  12  10,53  2,19 
Czech Republic    12  10,29  2,14 
Belgium 5  12  10,21  2,12 
Hungary   12  10,09  2,10 
Portugal 5  12  9,98  2,07 
Sweden 4  10  8,85  1,84 
Bulgaria   10  8,23  1,71 
Austria 4  10  8,08  1,68 
Slovakia   7  5,39  1,12 
Denmark 3  7  5,31  1,10 
Finland 3  7  5,16  1,07 
Ireland 3  7  3,74  0,78 
Lithuania   7  3,70  0,77 
Latvia   4  2,44  0,51 
Slovenia   4  1,98  0,41 
Estonia   4  1,45  0,30 
Cyprus   4  0,75  0,16 
Luxembourg 2  4  0,43  0,09 
Malta   3  0,38  0,08 
Total EU 27  87  345  481,18  100 
Qualified majority of vote
 
62 258/255*
(as well as a 
majority of  
members if  
proposal from 
Commission, 
otherwise 
two-thirds of 
members) 
  
Furthermore at  
least 62% of the
Union population
if a member  
state asks for  
control of 
this criterion 
Blocking minority  26 88/91*     
Sources: Treaty texts and European Parliament, ”Draft Treaty of Nice (initial analysis),” Brussels, 
10 January 2001. Galloway, 2001, p. 88. The final version of the Nice Treaty was published in the 
Official Journal of the European Communities C 80, 10 March 2001.   18
* On the confusion about the qualified majority and blocking minority, see chapter 21 in Laursen, 
forthcoming (see also Agence Europe, 23 December 2000). 
 
Concerning institutional issues the Brussels meeting of the European Council in 
October 2002 decided that the weighting of votes in the Council for the period between 
accession and 31 December 2004 would follow the then existing weights (see weights in 
table 5). In EU-25 this would mean a total of 124 votes, with a qualified majority vote 
being set at 88 votes. From 1 January 2005 the votes established by the Treaty of Nice 
and its attached declaration will apply, starting with 29 votes for the four biggest 
Member States and graduated down to 3 votes for Malta (see weights in table 6). In EU-
25 this will give a total of 321 votes, and the QMV was set at 232. A QMV, as stipulated 
by Nice, will also include a majority of Member States, in some cases two-thirds of the 
members. Further, a member may request verification that the Member States 
constituting the qualified majority represent at least 62% of the total population of the 
Union (Annex I, European Council 2002a). 
 
  As the Heads of State or Government left Nice some of them had their doubts. They 
decided to have yet another IGC in 2004 in order to make the EU more efficient and 
legitimate. The Laeken summit in December 2001 decided that this IGC should be prepared 
by a Convention, with relatively large representation by the EP and national parliaments 
(Laursen, 2003b).  By July 2003 this Convention produced a draft Constitutional Treaty, 
which was then sent to an IGC that started on October 4, 2004. A meeting of the European 
Council in Brussels in December 2003 failed to reach a final agreement on the 
Constitutional Treaty. Especially the question of voting in the Council was controversial. 
The Convention had proposed a simple double majority; a majority of states which should 
also represent at least 60% of the EU’s population would constitute a QMV. But Spain and 
Poland defended the more cumbersome system of weights agreed in Nice because Nice gave 
them a relatively high number of votes. In the end an agreement was found by June 2004. 
The double majority system was accepted, but the thresholds were increased to 55% of the 
states representing 65% of the EU population. This system will start from 2009 if the 
Constitutional Treaty is ratified by all 25 Member States (Laursen, 2004). 
 
 
Current Candidates 
 
As mentioned earlier both Bulgaria and Romania how concluded accession negotiations and 
are expected to join in 2007. On 13 April the European Parliament voted to give green light 
to membership. Bulgaria’s accession was backed with a 522-70 vote with 69 abstentions. In 
the case of Romania the vote was 497-93, with 71 abstentions. Romania is seen as the least 
prepared for membership. It is also considered more corrupt than Bulgaria. The Commission 
will publish its annual report in November and this report is expected to determine whether 
the two countries will join in 2007 or 2008 (Financial Times, April 14, 2005). 
 
  Croatia is next in line. Membership negotiations should have started by now, but 
have been put on hold by the EU on 16 March 2005 because Croatia has not cooperated 
sufficiently with the UN war crimes tribunal in The Hague. Croatia has failed to hand over 
General Ante Gotovina to the court. Gotovina is wanted by the court for alleged killing of  19
over 150 ethnic Serbs and for expelling about 150,000 at the end of the 1991-95 war. He is 
considered a national hero in Croatia. The government claims that it does not know where 
he is (“EU shelves Croatia talks,” www.EurActiv, 16 March 2005). The decision to shelve 
the talks with Croatia, which was mainly pushed by Britain, has upset Croatia and its 
supporters inside the EU, especially Austria, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia (Financial 
Times, March 15, 2005; Le nouvel Observateur, 16 Mars 2005). The European Council has 
established a monitoring team with CFSP High Representative Javier Solana and officials 
from the current and future Presidencies, Luxembourg, the UK and Austria, which will draw 
up a report by May. On the basis of the report it may be decided to open accession talks with 
Croatia before talks will start with Turkey (“Summit gives another chance to Croatia” at 
www.EurActiv.com,16 March 2005). Croatia hopes to join in 2007. But the Commission 
President Jose Manuel Barroso thinks 2009 is more realistic. 
 
  The most controversial among the current candidates is Turkey. But in December 
2004 Turkey was promised that membership negotiations will start on 3 October 2005. One 
condition is that Turkey takes steps to recognize Cyprus before. This is expected to be done 
through Turkey signing a protocol to its association agreement with the EU which will 
extend the agreement to the 10 new member states, including Cyprus. It is expected that 
negotiations will take at least a decade. The aim is full membership, but that outcome is not 
guaranteed. But, according to the December agreement, Turkey must in any case be 
“anchored in European structures through the strongest possible bond” (“EU offers Turkey a 
date – but Cyprus remains the key,” www.EurActiv.com , 17 December 2004). A Turkish 
accession agreement may in the end include longer transition periods than seen in the past. 
Free movement of labour/persons is an extremely sensitive issue in many member states. 
Some kind of permanent safeguard clause may have to be included in an accession treaty. 
Turkish membership will also have a big impact on CAP and structural funds. But those 
financial problems will only have to be dealt with in the financial framework after the 2007-
13 framework currently being negotiated. But if Turkey keeps on with ongoing reforms and 
implement them fully and sort out the Cyprus issue the prediction must be that Turkey will 
eventually join. The prediction is complicated by the fact that France has decided to have a 
referendum on the issue. 
 
Future Candidates – Where Will it end? 
 
The remaining states of former Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Macedonia have been promised membership in the future on the basis of the 
Copenhagen Criteria. And Albania is in this same group. The future status of Kosovo is still 
uncertain. 
 
   In 2000 the EU started the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) with the 
Western Balkan states designed to encourage and support the domestic reform process. 
 
  The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) was the first country in the 
region to sign a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) in 2001. It entered into 
force on 1 April 2004. Macedonia submitted its application for EU membership on 22 
March 2004 (“EU-Western Balkans relations,” www.EurActiv.com, 12 April 2005).  20
 
  Recently the Commission has recommended that negotiations on a Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement (SAA) start with Serbia and Montenegro. An SAA could be the first 
step towards membership. One condition is full cooperation with the UN war tribunal in The 
Hague (“Commission says Serbia and Montenegro ready for negotiations”, 
www.EurActiv.com, 13 April 2005). 
 
  The latest development is that other states from the former Soviet Union - other than 
the Baltic States that have joined in 2004 - have started expressing an interest in 
membership. This includes especially the Ukraine after its change of government in January 
2005.The new president Viktor Yushchenko quickly stated full membership of the EU as his 
“strategic goal”  (“Yushchenko to launch Ukraine’s bid to join EU,” www.EurActiv.com, 
20 January, 2005). For the moment Ukraine has a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
(PCA) which entered into force in 1998. Ukraine also falls under the EU’s 2004 so-called 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Neither the PCA nor the ENP open up the prospect 
of membership. However, Commission Vice President Margot Wallström has called the 
Ukraine vision of membership “realistic” (“Prospect of Ukraine’s membership ‘realistic’,” 
www.EurActiv.com, 25 January 2005). And Ukraine’s membership is supported by 55% of 
the voters in the EU’s largest member states, i.e. Germany, France, the UK, Italy, Spain and 
Poland, while Turkey’s bid is only favoured by 45% (“European voters: Ukraine would be 
most welcome,” www.EurActiv.com, 24 March 2005). 
 
  But what about Moldova, Belarus, etc.? If Europe is a geographic concept it 
stretches to the Urals and includes part of Russia.  
 
  Moldova has a PCA that entered into force in 1998. Solution of the Transdniestrian 
conflict in the eastern part of the country is considered important by the EU. But the 
government, led by the Communist Party is pro-European (“Moldova: Victorious 
Communists eyeing European integration,” www.EurActic.com, 8 March 2005). 
 
  There are no contractual links between the EU and Belarus. The country’s current 
regime is considered too authoritarian.  
 
  For the moment the prospect of Ukraine’s membership suggests that the EU at some 
stage will have to decide where the EU’s future eastern border will go.  
 
 
Policy Implications: Looking into the future 
 
It is well known that it is difficult to predict about the future. What we do know is that we 
now have a much wider EU, and we expect further enlargements in the future. But are the 
institutions up to the job of making it function? Many feel that the ratification of the 
Constitutional Treaty will be a help, partly because it includes more majority voting. 
 Day-to-day  decision-making will surely be made more difficult when you have a 
greater number of players with more diverse interests. A number of policy areas will be 
affected. We suggest:  21
 
1.  Changing the CAP will become more difficult. The CEECs benefiting from the 
current CAP will resist change the way especially France has resisted change in the 
past. 
2.  Decisions about financial frameworks and budgets will become even more difficult 
than they already are. Most of these decisions still require unanimity (and will 
continue to do so according to the draft Constitutional Treaty) and the net payers are 
not willing to contribute more. The financial framework for 2007-2013 will be a 
huge political battle. 
3.  Developing a ‘progressive’ environmental policy may well slow down. The CEECs 
do not want measures that will increase production costs. 
4.  Something similar may happen in the areas of social and labour market policies and 
taxation. The CEECs are eager to try to follow Ireland’s example. They want to 
attract investments. So regulation of production will be kept at the required 
minimum and corporate taxes will be low. 
5.  In the area of CFSP the CEECs will join the UK in a rather pro-American group, 
making it difficult for the EU to speak with one voice internationally. The 
development of an autonomous EU defence policy may be hampered. 
6.  The issues of border controls and migration will remain on the EU agenda for a 
number of years. Not only do many in the EU-15 Member States fear that the free 
movement of persons will lead to a lot of immigration from the new Member States, 
but there is also a fear that there will be more illegal immigration from further east. 
Some of the EU’s new eastern neighbours are to a large extent failed states that have 
not succeed in policies of transition to democracy and market economies. They 
could therefore produce refugees and this is combined with a fear that the new 
member states will have lax border controls. 
 
  So the question remains: Will the EU be able to manage the increased diversity? If 
not there is a risk of a return to the kind of power politics that Europe knew in the past. 
Some Realist scholars have predicted such a development (Mearsheimer, 1990). But liberal 
institutionalists point to the important role played by institutions in Europe today (Keohane, 
Nye and Hoffmann, 1993; Moravcsik, 1996). It will indeed take good, efficient, democratic 
and legitimate institutions to get the new EU to function. The ratification of the 
Constitutional Treaty would be a step – but only a step – in such direction. 
 
  Some observers who see the basic philosophy of the founding fathers of European 
integration, Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, and others, with its emphasis on the role of 
‘supranational’ institutions, as important for Europe’s future, are worried that the new 
members have not fully understood and accepted that philosophy. That philosophy puts 
emphasis on ‘upgrading the common interest’ and not just stubbornly defending national 
interests. The EU has created a polity. It is more than purely intergovernmental cooperation 
(Laursen, 2003a). 
 
  Should EU-25 not be able to solve the problems, then the main alternative may be 
‘enhanced cooperation’ between a smaller group of states. After the failure of the IGC in 
December 2003 the French and Germans again talked about the possibility of an avant- 22
garde, a pioneer group of states that could move ahead and leave the laggards in a more 
peripheral situation. We can hope such a scenario can be avoided. But there is a risk that 
some Member States cannot ratify the Constitutional Treaty. The Heads of State or 
Government will then face the difficult question of what to do with this arrière-garde. 
Should it be asked to leave the EU and seek some association agreement? Or should the EU 
fall back on the Treaty oif Nice with its various shortcomings? 
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